THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

No. 2. MAY, 1940. Vol. XXX.

SIGNS OF THE TIMES

A Declining Church and the Remedy.

The *Nineteenth Century* (May, 1940) publishes a remarkable contribution by Kenneth Henderson, a well-known Australian journalist, on 'The Church To-day.' To him the Church seems to be lacking in realism, modernity, initiative and creative power. This is due to its timid traditionalism, false conservatism and self-regarding policy. This accounts not only for its declining numbers, but for the lowered quality of those who remain among its practising members. In this connection he asks two pertinent questions: (1) 'Why does God appear to be leaving institutional Christianity?' (2) 'What different thing must we make of the Church that God may return to it?' In answer to the first question Mr. Henderson writes:

> 'The fact implied in the first dreadful question needs no proof or emphasis here. It is often thrust at us in the facile gloatings of the enemies of Christianity, but is evident enough, not only or mainly in the dwindling numbers of those who join themselves together for public worship, but in the falling quality of leadership, and the loss of respect and influence without, and the ebbing of confidence and creative power within. The Christian community is not getting its share of the finest minds of our time; the men and women who are making the world for good and ill are not drawing balance, sanity and inspiration from the Church.

> In the Christian congregations there is not the kind of fellowship—warm, brotherly, and agonising for the life of the day. . . . The development of the critical spirit has been our own age's enlargement of man's capacity, and in our hesitation to accept with more candour and generosity the findings of modern enquiry for the reshaping of the forms of our belief, we offend the finer spirits of our time just where they are most right—in their sense of evidence. By distrust we cut off from us the Spirit as Movement. . . .
>
> False conservatism excludes from the Christian ministry men and women with the disturbing gifts of prophecy, criticism and creative originality, because it sins against the virtue of modern culture which is its critical realism and sense of evidence. It is a closing of windows to the "wind that bloweth where it listeth." It is a false opposition between the creative achievements of the past and the inspiration that struggles to break forth from the present.'

In answer to the second question, 'What different thing must we make of the Church that God may return to it?' Mr. Henderson writes:

> 'It is futile and faithless to wait with hands hanging down in the hope that some great and irresistible prophet will appear who will somehow make all things new without asking us to make new things. Every faithful member of the Christian Church must try to be an organic part of that Prophet, Who is speaking already in the manifold agonies of war, and the tasks of a world's re-making. The upward and forward movements of prayer are the makings of leadership. Through the prayer that listens to God as Reality, we break out of littleness and inertia to accept responsibility for what we hear; through the prayer of constructive imagination we identify ourselves with What is Meant to Be; through fearless prayer together we draw into ourselves the Power that comes from beyond things as they are to change them.'

Mr. Henderson is no inexperienced neophyte or outside critic of institutional Christianity. He served as a chaplain at Gallipoli with the Anzacs: he is a graduate of Melbourne and Oxford Universities: he has made an influential position for himself in the world of Australian journalism: he might have been an important factor in the guidance of Australian Church policy had the Australian Church authorities given him the opportunity. But they feared his courage and initiative as much as they feared his criticism and prophetic realism. We anticipate that he will become much better known to our English religious public both within and without the Churches when his book, *Prayers of Citizenship*, is published next month by Longmans, Green and Co. The remarkable Preface to that volume will be found to express Mr. Henderson's convictions and ideals with greater fullness than has been possible in his arresting contribution to the *Nineteenth Century*.

Evolution and Christian Theology.

The Inaugural Address which was to have been delivered on September 3 by the venerable President of the British Association, Sir Richard Gregory, F.R.S., but was prevented by the outbreak of war, has been recently published in the Report of the British Association.* The theme of the address, 'Contacts of Religion and Science,' as treated by Sir Richard Gregory witnesses to the steady development of better relations between the exponents of science and those of Christianity. Sir Richard opens by asserting that

> 'There is really no conflict between religion and science: one is the expression of an instinct for communion with a Supreme Being: the other is a spirit of inquiry into all things visible and invisible in the universe.'

Dealing with the Scriptures, he proceeds:

> 'The message they convey was spiritual and not rational. All things were interpreted as testimonies to the wisdom and power of the Almighty and His goodness to man—as subjects of wonder and spiritual exaltation rather than as matters of intellectual inquiry. As a record of spiritual development, the Holy Scriptures are far in advance of the sacred writings of any other early peoples, and represent an important stage in the evolution of this side of human nature.
>
> It is in the light of service to high ideals that science, without which we cannot live, and religion, without which most people see no meaning in life, can find a common field of action.'

Conclusions such as these are generally accepted to-day by educated men and women concerned with human needs and the problems of human progress. On looking back on the controversies between science and religion which were so characteristic of the second half of the nineteenth century, we marvel at the one-sidedness of the controversialists and their consequent failure to achieve a higher synthesis. We are bound, however, to blame the ecclesiastics for this state of affairs much more than the scientists. The ecclesiastics insisted that the Bible, being infallible in all its teaching, was absolutely true in its scientific statements, and that where the scientists differed from the Bible they were as wrong scientifically as they were disloyal to Divine revelation. If we have peace to-day between the scientists and the ecclesiastics it is because Christian teachers are, as Sir Richard Gregory maintains,

* Published by the British Association. 1940. 5*s*.

'applying evolutionary principles to religious thought, and are studying sacred books as stages in the story of man's progressive discovery in theology. It is only by disregarding history that the idea of a fixed and final theology becomes possible. In science, there are no final interpretations or unchangeable hypotheses: and when the same principle is recognized in theology, religion will share some of the vitality of the natural sciences. Evolution can be regarded by the theologian as merely the means of creation: and the conception of gradual development is not incompatible with Christian theology. It is through the acceptance of the idea of evolution in the spirit as well as in the body of man that the partition which formerly separated religion and science is being dissolved.'

THE NEW ECUMENICAL CREED.

In the *Hibbert Journal* for April, 1940, Professor John Wright Bucham, of the Pacific School of Religion, California, examines and criticizes with acumen and vigour the newest of our Ecumenical creeds. This creed demands the acceptance of 'Our Lord Jesus Christ as God and Saviour' as a necessary condition for admittance into the World Council of Christian Churches.

We do not know who was the author of this dogmatic formulary, but it could only have been someone who was ignorant of the evolution of Christian thought and its Conciliar formulation. To speak of our Lord Jesus Christ as God in this absolute manner is definitely heretical. Professor Bucham, after tracing concisely the evolution of christological speculation and formulation, writes:

'It is not necessary to pursue the history of this arduous attempt at definition and evaluation further. This is more than enough to make clear that to term Jesus Christ 'God' cannot be reconciled with the historic witness of Christian experience and Christian theology. As it stands, the statement is out of keeping with the Synoptic Gospels, with Paulinism, with the Fourth Gospel, the Roman Symbol, the Logos doctrine of Alexandria, Nicene Trinitarianism, and othodox theology in general.'

Although we do not know who was the author of this new symbol it seems highly probable that it is the product of recent Continental Protestantism, as it appears to have been first formulated at Utrecht. Inasmuch as representatives of the Church of England are members of the World Council of Christian Churches, and therefore must have been compelled to give formal assent to this heretical symbol, it is a great pity that our English Church ahthorities, or at least the chief of them, should

have permitted its adoption without criticism and without protest.

No Roman Catholic is a member of the World Council of Christian Churches, nor could he ever become a member on such terms. We do not urge that our Church of England representatives should withdraw from the Council, for the aim of the Council is eminently desirable, but we would urge them to take steps to secure the substitution of a Confession of Faith in harmony with the continuity of Christian thought. Some whose orthodoxy as well as their scholarship is deeply pained by the adoption of this new Ecumenical symbol have suggested that perhaps the addition of a supplementary interpretive statement would be the best way of dealing with the situation. We believe that the more honest way, the more effectual way, and the most beneficial way of solving the problem is to substitute some simple orthodox affirmation for this piece of dogmatic crudity.

Propagation of Legend.

In the Nasik (Deccan) Diocesan Gazette for March, 1940, the Bishop, formerly Vice-Principal of Cuddesdon, directs attention to the institution of the Feast of St. Joseph (March 19) and the Falling Asleep of the Blessed Virgin Mary (August 15), and instructs his people that Collects, Epistles and Gospels were sanctioned by the Diocesan Synod for use on those days. The Collect for St. Joseph's day runs as follows:

> O God, who didst call Blessed Joseph to be the faithful guardian of thine only-begotten Son and the spouse of his Virgin Mother; Give us grace to follow his example in constant worshipping of thee and obedience to thy commands; that our homes may be sanctified by thy Presence, and our children nurtured in thy fear and love; through the same Jesus Christ our Lord, who with thee and the Holy Ghost liveth and reigneth, one God, world without end. *Amen.*

No exception can reasonably be taken to the wording of this Collect nor to the purpose for which its use is prescribed, but we confess that many Church people will feel apprehension at its being combined with the sanctioning of the Festival of the Falling Asleep of the Blessed Virgin Mary, which coincides with the Feast of the Assumption of the B.V.M. in the Roman calendar.

In the *First Prayer Book of King Edward VI* (1549) there were two festivals (if we exclude Christmas Day) instituted to commemorate events in the life of St. Mary: (1) the Purification

CHURCH DIVINITY SCHOOL OF THE PACIFIC LIBRARY

(Feb. 2) and (2) the Annunciation (March 25). Both of these are entirely scriptural. In our Prayer Book of 1662 two more Virgin Mary festivals were added, the Visitation (July 2) and St. Anne, the mother of the Virgin (July 26). The first of these is of course scriptural, the second is purely legendary and is a black letter saint's day, although we remember that in St. Anne's Church, Manchester, some years ago, she was treated as a red letter saint with a special Collect, Epistle and Gospel. In the *Deposited Book* (1927-28) the following Virgin Mary festivals were added to the Calendar: the Conception of the Virgin (Dec. 8) and the Nativity of the Virgin (Sept. 8). These black letter festivals are based on no historical knowledge. Now we have added in one of our Anglican Indian Dioceses another Virgin Mary festival, the Falling Asleep of the B.V.M. (Aug. 15).

It may be supposed by some that in days when, as the result of historical research, the Virgin Birth of our Lord is ceasing to be viewed as an historical event, the best way of securing credit for it is by stressing the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin herself and other legendary occasions in her life for the dates of which we have no historical evidence whatsoever. There are others, however, who are convinced that this deliberate mixing of the legendary with the historical must prove detrimental and disastrous. We know that good money is driven out of circulation by bad money, and the liturgical commemoration of legendary persons and events in our manual of public worship must, for many who realize what is being done, create suspicions even with regard to the commemoration of historic persons and events. The Tudor reformers of our public worship maintained that they had excluded from the public worship of the Church of England not only all that was false but even all that was doubtful. Loyalty to their ideals and methods ought to inspire us to continue their difficult and dangerous work of liturgical purgation. But such a reversal of their policy as we have been compelled to record must be for loyal sons of our Church something which is as depressing as it is alarming. The late Fr. Woodlock, S.J., maintained that the Church of England was being honeycombed by Modernism, but what we have recorded suggests that, in some spheres at least, it is being corrupted by fictions which the better sort of Roman Catholic scholars would repudiate.

ST. CROCKFORD.

Paulinus of Nola, a friend of St. Augustine, and for many years Bishop of Nola in Campania, initiated his residence among the Christians of Nola by writing a poem on the birthday (*Natale*) of their local Saint and Confessor, St. Felix. This graceful act was hailed with becoming delight by the Bishop's flock, but compelled him when the birthday of the local Saint returned to produce another poem in his honour. For nearly twenty successive years Paulinus produced his annual poem celebrating the virtues of St. Felix, but with increasing difficulty —not because he considered as the years passed by that the Saint was less worthy of the poem, but that the annual poem was becoming less worthy of the Saint—the poet being unable to write anything new about him without resort to fiction, which would be most immoral in the eyes of a hagiologist.

This is the situation in which the annual reviewer of Crockford finds himself. For years past we have regarded *Crockford's Clerical Directory** as one of the best conducted of our Anglican Institutions. It is remarkable for conscientious accuracy, convenience of arrangement, and fullness of information. St. Irenaeus, in a passage of dubious interpretation, writing of the Church of Rome, remarked that all Christians resort thither. In the case of Crockford, all English clergymen have to do likewise, and happy are they who are not compelled to make a journey to the Public Library for that purpose.

We have often remarked on the interest of Crockford's Prefaces. They summarize concisely the chief events in the life of the Anglican Church for the past year, and do not refrain from judicious criticism. Dealing with petitions presented to Convocation in reference to the *Doctrinal Report*, Crockford doubts, in the light of seventy years' experience, both the intelligence and value of such action.

The 1940 Preface contains much useful information about other Christian communions. For instance, we learn from it that the movement for unity among the Reformed Churches of France is making good progress. The Reformed Church and the Reformed Evangelical Church have already united.

* *Crockford's Clerical Directory for 1940.* 69th Issue. (Oxford University Press. Price 42*s.*; India paper 63*s.*)

'It is hoped that the French Methodists will follow suit, with the goodwill of their co-religionists in England.'

It would appear that all the Protestant congregations in France do not exceed 700.

Conferences have been held for several years past by English representatives with the Esthonian and Latvian Churches which are Evangelical Lutheran. We are glad to see that as a result of these conferences it has been agreed that their Bishops are to be invited to the Lambeth Conference and their communicants admitted to our altars. Should they desire co-consecration in the case of their Bishops, this will be readily granted.

An overseas Bishop, in writing to its Editor, describes *Crockford* as a 'wonderful book.' We feel that it is about time that Crockford was canonised.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SAMUEL ALEXANDER

By J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc., author of *Religion and Science from Galileo to Bergson*, etc.

THE recent publication of some of the late Professor Alexander's philosophical essays[1] renders appropriate a few remarks about the views of this most original of modern British philosophers. What is peculiar and interesting about Alexander from the standpoint of the ordinary man is that while his philosophy was definitely a form of Naturalism—a view of things which usually involves materialism, agnosticism, or atheism—it nevertheless found a place for God and for religion. Furthermore, neither of these were tucked away in a corner of his system or added as a kind of appendage to propitiate clerical or middle-class prejudice, but were an integral part of the system itself.

Alexander himself defined the method of naturalism as 'the method of impartial description and analysis, as practised with appropriate means in the natural sciences.' In striving as a philosopher to comprehend the world and its contents, including

[1] *Philosophical and Literary Pieces.* By Samuel Alexander, O.M. Edited by his Literary Executor. (Macmillan; 15*s*.).

Man with his activities and values, Alexander accepted the data supplied by the natural sciences. In short, he belonged to the class of thinker who works from below upwards, and not (like Plato) from above downwards. In technical parlance, he was a Realist; that is to say he held, among other things, that the objects of sense experience exist in their own right and independently of the observer. Not of course as the observer sees them (the physicists have shown us that a material object is something very different from what it appears to our senses), but as they actually are.

There is, as a matter of fact, far more than race (both were Jews) in common between Alexander and his great seventeenth century predecessor, Spinoza. Both, though not actually men of science in the sense that they conducted scientific researches, were fully acquainted with the scientific knowledge of their time; while in the case of both, their science and their religious faith fell naturally into their proper places within their schemes of reality. In a lecture on Spinoza included in the present volume Alexander makes this point clear, and suggests that twentieth century thought has more in common with that of the seventeenth than with that of the eighteenth and nineteenth.

> 'Spinoza,' he writes, 'is at once a man of science, a philosopher, and a believer, and so far from there being dissension or discrepancy in his mind between these three things, his science and his religious faith fell naturally into their places within the scheme of his philosophy. In the seventeenth century, at least among its greater minds, this fracture so familiar to us had not occurred. It was the eighteenth century with its rationalism and the nineteenth with its sciences which brought in doubt, till instead of accepting religion and God as part of the one world, men began to find excuses for religion, or professed indifference and uncertainty, or even denied its claims. But Spinoza is both man of science and mystic, and his mystical faith is the outcome of the same method which he applies to physics.'

Since the days of Spinoza developments in the sphere of two sciences more especially have carried our thinking about the universe into new channels. In the nineteenth century there took place in the science of biology the revolutionary discovery of the evolution of species, while in the twentieth century there has taken place a not less revolutionary discovery in the sphere of physics. This last may be described as *the discovery of Time*. Men have always, of course, been aware of time, but they have regarded it as something that happens to things, changing them.

making them old, bearing them along, and so forth. But the physicists of the twentieth century found themselves forced to regard Time as a kind of fourth dimension, and to refer things no longer to three axes of co-ordinates, but to four, the fourth being the time axis. Time, in a word, is now integral to things, and the world is a world not of things but of *events*. As we find it stated in one of Alexander's essays:

> 'I fancy we are accustomed to think of the world as a mass of things spread out in one comprehensive Space, and somehow or other of Time as merely an interesting addition, whereby things happen and have a history. The discovery of Time means that we are to rid ourselves of this innocent habit of mind, and regard the world as through and through and intrinsically historical, and treat everything in it as events, not merely what are obviously events, but the most permanent things also, which seem to us fixed in their repose — stones and hills and tables — which become what Mr. Whitehead calls "chunks of events." This is the simple meaning of the proposition of the mathematicians that we live in a four-dimensional world.'

A corollary of this view is that there is no reality but that of events, and that Space has no reality apart from Time—indeed, that each is an abstraction by itself. This fourth dimension, of which we have experience, is not to be pictured, for it is non-spatial. We have indeed been living in a four-dimensional world all our lives without knowing it, just as M. Jourdain discovered that he had been talking prose all his life without knowing it. The fact that 'things' are really 'chunks of events' does not make them look or behave differently.

Professor Alexander's philosophy may most readily be understood as an interpretation of reality in terms (1) of evolution, and (2) of Time regarded as integral to things. An evolutionary philosophy, it is true, is no new thing; Herbert Spencer had worked one out in most exhaustive fashion even before Darwin had made good his theory; but the new theory of Time fits naturally in with evolutionary ideas, and Alexander achieved the amalgamation. The connection is indeed fairly obvious. Darwin's explanation of the origin of species was that from an indefinite number of 'variations' certain favoured ones were chosen out for survival and reproduction by means of 'natural selection.' But the reason for the occurrence of so many variations to be weeded out by 'a massacre of the innocents' remained shrouded in mystery. Lamarck and his disciples indeed attributed the

variations to the desires and efforts of the organism itself, which required a long neck or a spotted coat, as the case might be, for the purposes of life; but this view did not commend itself to the majority of biologists. But if the world is actually 'four-dimensional,' *i.e.* is a world of 'events,' not of 'things,' it is not so much change as the absence of change that demands explanation. It becomes natural that things should happen, and that in such a way that things do not simply go on repeating themselves, but that the new and unprecedented should emerge from time to time. In short, the idea of Time as 'integral' introduces a creative element into things. For Time thus regarded is something more than a mere 'forward movement,' and a Nature 'instinct with Time' (if we may use the phrase) becomes equivalent to Spinoza's *Natura naturans*, a universe as itself a free creative cause.

In Alexander's view, the temptation to seek the origin of the world in something other than itself is one to be resisted. For him, the process of creation consists in a conversion of the simple into the complex; and this simple 'stuff' of which all things created are more or less complex configurations, is itself uncreated (*causa sui*) and simply 'there.' In it, as in a matrix, are formed the graded complexities which acquire a semi-independent existence 'like crystals in the mother liquid in which they are deposited.' In short, the 'stuff' is itself creative, in the sense that these crystals or embryos 'grow in its womb.'

Alexander does not seek to obscure the divergence of this view from all such as derive the created world from 'primordial spirit' or a pre-existent Creator. He held that in attributing creation to an agency which is 'not less of a spirit than ourselves, but more of a spirit,' we are not securing simplicity, but only interpreting the simple by the complex. 'We merely substitute for the complex human spirit which we know, another more complex spirit which we do not know.'[2]

> 'It is as if we were to seek simplicity in our lives and habits, not by dispensing with unnecessaries but by returning to staining our

[2] Compare Pascal's 'We know not Man whom we have seen; how then shall we know God whom we have not seen?' It is a pity that Alexander in the essay on Pascal in the present volume deals only with the literary style of this great genius, and not with his beliefs — or lack of them. Alexander on Pascal as a *religious* thinker would have been illuminating.

> skins with woad or living on roots and cooking our game in a cave. We only vary our accidentals, choosing a more inconvenient form of them, which we imagine simpler. But the Universe in its basal character is fundamental to every form of product which grows up within it, and if we try to get down to fundamental simplicity it must not be in terms of the mind we know. The simple world may still contain its analogue to mind, but that mind will be more and not less elementary than ours.'

Alexander's plea was to 'de-anthropomorphise' philosophy. He urged the need to bear in mind that we ourselves are 'units in the outgrowth of the fundamental stuff of the world,' so that the world itself is subject to none of our ideas, but is the source of them.

What then is the nature of the primordial stuff which literally underlies the universe we know, and which 'is being itself, and neither cause nor substance nor one nor many nor things, but contains numbers and causes and things within itself, as real features or parts of itself and not merely emitted from itself into precarious appearance'? The materialists from Lucretius onwards have regarded atoms as the primordial stuff; but the physicists no longer regard such atoms as primary; they are not fundamental but themselves a development. For Alexander the 'stuff' of the universe is 'space-time.' This notion has something in common with the idea of motion, though it is not the motion of material particles, which is derivative. As he himself put it,

> 'Motion, understood as the primordial stuff, is what change becomes if you strip from change the notion of some quality which is replaced by some other quality. Rather the name is used to indicate that passage of nature of which Mr. Whitehead speaks, and to insist that the stuff of things is events and groups of events, not something fixed and resting but something which contains in itself a principle of unrest.'

This primordial stuff, because time is an indissoluble ingredient of it (he calls Time the animating mind of the body which is space), is instinct with change, and becomes the source of a variety of forms which are not an array but a procession. Space-Time, under the impulse of Time, falls of itself into new distributions of motion, into complexes which are bodies, some of which attain equilibrium and persist. Nature, infected with Time, 'not as a disease but as its vitality,' does not stop, but, pushing on, evolves out of these stable forms fresh distributions and a new order of beings. Experience shows us this evolution.

and science endeavours to exhibit its methods in detail. Space-Time 'germinates into the infinite variety of things in all their grades of development.' This impulse of creativeness in the original stuff of the universe Alexander calls its '*nisus*.'[3] This *nisus* leads not only to the formation of things and to the sustainment of them, 'but impels the world forward towards new creations, bringing forth the new out of the bosom of the old,' by fresh combinations.[4]

The *nisus* or striving of the world must not be thought of as effort to go beyond itself, since the infinite stuff cannot widen its limits. It goes beyond itself only by the effecting of fresh distributions of its motions into new complexes of motion. And this *nisus* is felt or shared by the individual forms in which it has resulted. Hence out of these forms new forms are developed, the result being a hierarchy of forms. From the physical level arises life; and out of life comes mind. Material things, caught in the *nisus* of events, give rise to living ones, and animate matter in its turn gives rise to mind-endowed beings.

So far, Alexander's is an evolutionary philosophy with not a little in common with that of Bergson.[5] As we have seen, he will not introduce into his system the idea of a creative mind behind the universe. Yet his idea of deity is central to his system, as the title of his *magnum opus*, *Space, Time and Deity* (1920) indicates, and is not at all difficult to grasp in spite of being highly unusual.

We have noted Alexander's conception of a *nisus* in the world impelling it to develop new levels of existence, to maintain them when developed, and to pass on from them to some-

[3] Spinoza used the Latin word *conatus* to describe the creative urge in Nature. Perhaps the difference in meaning between the respective terms (*nisus* and *conatus*) is that the latter conveys more the sense of conscious purpose, which Alexander wished to exclude. Both can roughly be translated by the word 'effort,' or 'striving.'

[4] It might seem from what was said in an earlier paragraph about Time being 'the animating mind of the body which is Space,' that there is no need for a *nisus*, since Time itself is the creative factor. But in Alexander's scheme of things Space is not just something upon which Time works, for Time itself could not exist except for Space, which is thus itself not less creative than Time, for it is not without the element of transition. It is not a *plenum* of things strung out in succession of place, but is the totality of *events* considered without their movement.

[5] M. Bergson is a member of the same race as Spinoza and Alexander.

thing new. Each of these levels in the hierarchy of beings is characterized by its distinctive quality — materiality, life, mind, as the case may be—each in its turn striven after but unpredictable by the level next below. And the characteristic quality of each level is 'deity' to the level next below, until that higher level has been reached and become actual. Thus before life had been developed, the characteristic quality of organic life was 'deity' to a world of inanimate matter. When life *had* been developed its organic embodiments were finite gods to that inanimate world. In a word, deity is 'the characteristic quality of the next higher level of existence prophesied by the *nisus* of the universe.' From the point of view of mind-endowed beings like ourselves (the latest products of the *nisus* to date), deity is the quality which the creative *nisus* will cause to supervene on mind as mind has supervened on life. Mind will be the 'body' of this deity, when attained, as the living organism is now the body of mind.

It might appear that on this view deity is something which, as it cannot as yet be said to exist, can hardly be thought of as equivalent to the God of religion as this has hitherto been understood. Was it perhaps, in Alexander's mind, nothing but a more or less abstract philosophical conception, a product of metaphysical reflection, and not proceeding from any proper understanding of religion? Such a view cannot be maintained; for Alexander attached great importance to religion (as he did to art), and regarded religious experience as definitely objective in character.

Although 'deity' from our standpoint is not yet actual, not yet having been developed out of mind, it does not follow that there is no God—and the kind of God who can be the object of religious belief, feeling, and practice. 'When we ask what for us is God,' writes Alexander, 'we must answer that it is the world as a whole with this *nisus* towards deity.' This is not so different from Spinoza's view which identified God and Nature. And the sentiment of religion, the emotion of worship, is our reaction to that creative element in the world, that *nisus* which is also present in ourselves (indeed we are its spearhead).

> 'Sharing in the *nisus* of the universe; caught as we are in the wheels of that being, which arising out of the chaos of Space-Time

> evolves levels of beings with their *conatus,* but always retains the unused chaos which allows of the emergence of new levels; we respond to that *nisus* in the feeling of oneness with the next higher type of quality which is to arise out of the level we or other minds have attained. As love, to go back to the old example, is in its essence a specified reaction to an individual of opposite sex, so religion is the reaction we make to God as the whole universe with its *nisus* towards the new quality of deity. . . . And like other emotions it leads to the intellectual apprehension of its object. Because the whole world in its *nisus* to deity evokes in us the response of religion, we become aware of the world as in this tendency divine, and apprehend God, as we apprehend the object of love to be lovely. The religious passion which we find in ourselves cries out for an object which intellect then sets itself the task of describing in intellectual terms, discovering its relation to observed realities.'

There can be no doubt that Alexander's view of deity, and of God as creative Nature, proved highly stimulating twenty years ago when it was promulgated; nor is the stimulus yet exhausted. Perhaps the view of religion involved is oriental rather than occidental, since oriental religious practice has always made its primary object the deliberate cultivation of new levels of consciousness and a wider awareness of reality. Occidental religion has been primarily concerned with conduct (which, properly speaking, ought only to be regarded as a by-product of religion), and has substituted for techniques of enlightenment an already revealed dogma. Western religion regards truth as already attained by supernatural revelation; eastern religion regards it as something to be striven after by patient and laborious techniques which clarify and deepen the spiritual vision. For the oriental the supernatural is accessible to all men who will strive to transcend their own nature, and discoveries in the spiritual sphere are still possible. For the occidental the supernatural is a kind of second world superimposed on this one, and final knowledge about it has once for all been revealed.

Whether the reader can or cannot accept in their totality, and with their corollaries explicit and implicit, the views of Samuel Alexander, is not, perhaps, the important point. The ideas are worth trying to understand, partly because they were worked out by a mind of fine quality and complete honesty, and partly because they are 'seminal' ideas, stimulating and not deadening imagination and thought.

THE FOURTH GOSPEL: 'HISTORY' OR 'THEOLOGY'?

SIR EDWYN HOSKYNS' 'THEOLOGICAL' COMMENTARY*

By the Rev. Dr. C. J. Wright, Didsbury College, Manchester.

LET me begin what I have to say about the late Sir Edwyn Hoskyns' Commentary on the Fourth Gospel with a very sincere word of gratitude. If in the beyond he is aware of, as he must be interested in, the reactions of his reviewers he will know that it is in no perfunctory way that the present writer says, 'Thank you.' I had not to read very far in these two substantial volumes, representing as they do many years of research and thought, before I recognized that an unusually stimulating theological commentary was before me. Nor must the editor be forgotten at this point. Mr. Davey has edited Hoskyn's uncompleted work with great scholarship and skill.

Before looking critically at some fundamental issues let me first indicate the character of the work. It is essentially a 'theological' exposition of the Gospel. It is necessary to put the key word in italics, for it has no single and unambiguous meaning. But it may here be used in contrast with 'historical' or 'critical.' Hoskyns begins his Introduction with the statement: 'The Gospel according to Saint John is a strictly "theological" work,' himself italicizing the key word, in recognition, no doubt, in these days of many and conflicting 'theologies,' that its meaning should not be taken for granted. The traditional author of the Gospel has been called 'the *theologos*.' Yet his Gospel, as will be evident to everyone acquainted with 'theological' literature, is at the furthest remove from the great bulk of the literature so designated. Hoskyns writes:

> 'Whatever the Fourth Gospel may be, it is not a text-book of metaphysics. Primarily it is the text-book of the parish priest and the inspiration of the straightforward layman.'

* *The Fourth Gospel.* By the late Sir Edwyn Hoskyns. Edited by F. N. Davey. (Faber and Faber. 2 vols. 30*s*. net. 1940.)

That this is a true judgment is evidenced from the experience of Christians in every age. They have turned to *St. John* to find a message about God and Eternity, and about the meaning and destiny of human life: and they have not turned in vain.

Nevertheless, a 'theological' Gospel — like everything else that has happened in this world of human experience — is a fact of 'history.' Likewise, Hoskyns' 'theological' commentary on this 'theological' Gospel is a fact of 'history.' Inescapable 'historical' questions, therefore, arise in the mind of every intelligent reader when he sits down before either the Fourth Gospel itself or this new commentary. Since I am at the moment concerned with the commentary, and not with the Gospel, I will point out some of Hoskyns' 'historical' and 'psychological' judgments about it.

> 'The Fourth Gospel, whatever may have been the original form of the material out of which it was made, is a literary unity, not an arrangement of incidents.'

On the *Logos* Prologue Hoskyns writes:

> 'The theory that the prologue stands in a direct or indirect literary relationship to the Philonic writings, except in so far as both are dependent upon the Jewish Scriptures and upon Jewish tradition, raises more difficulties than it solves. The whole theory of a direct connection between the prologue to the Fourth Gospel and Greek philosophy is open to very grave objections. The interpretation of the *Logos* in the prologue is intimately bound up with the interpretation of the Gospel as a whole.'

Both these statements — which I am glad to be able to quote, inasmuch as I believe them to be correct, and have myself previously maintained them — are psychological and historical judgments: and they necessarily determine Hoskyns' interpretation of the Gospel itself. A similar important judgment is found in the commentator's interpretation of 'the Water of Life' passage in *Jn.* iv, 8-15. Pointing out several Old Testament and Jewish references, he says:

> 'These . . . are quite sufficient to explain the background of the discourse; it does not seem necessary to add . . . references to Mandaean and Hermetic texts. Such parallels belong to the study of comparative religion rather than to the exegesis of the Fourth Gospel.'

A few other interesting judgments of Hoskyns may here be mentioned. The First Epistle of John 'must be assumed to have come from the same hand as the Gospel.' The Synoptists'

dating of the Cleansing of the Temple is accepted. The present order of chapter vi in the Gospel is the original order. While agreeing with each of these controversial judgments, I mention them here, not for that reason, but to emphasize that they are the interpretations of a historical person who has sought to understand a book written at a specific time in a specific place and by a specific person. And it is obvious that the 'theological' interpretation of this 'theological' Gospel is not unrelated to these historical and psychological judgments.

The interpretation of the 'signs' is, of course, a crucial issue for every interpreter of the Fourth Gospel. Hoskyns writes:

> 'They are not narrated as prodigies, or wonders, nor do they merely authenticate Jesus. They are quite properly signs of parables (*sic*) of the nature of His work: they manifest His glory.'

In the light of this principle they are interpreted in the Commentary. The inescapable 'historical' question remains, which every intelligent reader, including the 'theological' reader, cannot but confront, namely, Are these narratives 'historical' as well as 'symbolical,' or an intermingling of the two and, if so, in what proportions? Hoskyns *seems*—I cannot speak here with confidence, for I have found a certain obscurity throughout the Commentary—to take, on the whole, a conservative or traditionalist position. At Cana of Galilee 'what took place was a creative act that is not and cannot be described': the important phrase here, of course, is 'creative act,' which presumably means, according to the commentator, that material water was changed into material wine. As against Bernard, he does not regard the narrative of the Walking on the Sea as 'devoid of miracle.' On the narratives of the man born blind and of Lazarus he writes:

> 'These miraculous actions are not introduced as proofs of a doctrine or as symbolical illustrations of Christian mysticism; they constitute the revelation of the power of Jesus, and the truth is manifested in His historical action. The supremacy of Christian faith is thus shewn to rest *upon decisive actions in the human life of Jesus*.' (Italics mine.—C.J.W.)

In the Lazarus story, according to Hoskyns, 'a miracle within a miracle' is recorded: thus the emergence from the tomb of the *bound* Lazarus is interpreted. At the same time it is said, 'the form of the record of the raising of Lazarus suggests the freedom that results from the mighty act of God by which the

Christians have passed from death to life.' On the other hand, Hoskyns rejects, it would seem, the historicity of 'the 153 fishes' of chapter xxi:

> 'So long as the accuracy and supposed oddity of the number be explained as preserving the memory of the Evangelist who helped to count the fish, no true interpretation of the narrative as a whole is possible.'

The same obscurity over 'history' and 'symbolism' is found in the interpretation of the 'five husbands' of the woman of Samaria. In passages he writes as though they were historical, in passages as though they were 'an allusion to the five heathen peoples who with their different deities had been introduced into Samaria.'

. . . . . .

Thus I am led to the central issue which this erudite and suggestive commentary raises. It is nothing less than the *nature* and the *ground* of the 'theology' expressed in the Fourth Gospel. Any reviewer who is *really* grateful to an author must show his gratitude by discussing, however briefly, the central and all-pervading conception of the book.

It is clear that Hoskyns, the translator of Barth's *Römerbrief*, was much influenced by Barthian 'theological' conceptions. This is most seen in references, scattered throughout the commentary, as well as in the Introduction, to the relation of 'history' to 'theology.'

It is obvious to every competent student of the New Testament that not only the Fourth Gospel but *all* the Gospels are 'theological'—in the sense that they are based upon, and pervaded by, the faith, or, if it is preferred, the conviction, that in the historic Person of Jesus Christ there is a unique disclosure of the nature and will of the Eternal God whom no man has ever seen. The Person of Jesus Christ was a historic fact. What He thought, and said, and did, was the historical ground of the faith, the interpretation, the conviction, of the Evangelists. It may be difficult for us to-day to reach complete certitude as to what Jesus thought, and said, and did: in view of the differences in the Gospels themselves this difficulty is unavoidable. But it cannot be disputed that the faith out of which the Gospels arose, itself a 'historical' fact, derived its meaning from *what had*

happened in history. If I were discussing the issue in a wider context I should go on to maintain that the faith, or the 'theological' conviction, of every man who has ever lived in this world of time and space has derived its meaning from what has happened in history: the principle being true not only of a 'Christian' faith, or 'theological' interpretation, but of *every* faith, or interpretation. This is as undeniable as the fact of a historical universe and of historical people in it. (Of course some people may 'deny' the principle; but such denial is, as I cannot but maintain, a *dialectic of escape*, and in the line of the 'wishful thinking' which has swept over humanity in recent years.)

It cannot, therefore, be maintained that the Fourth Gospel is 'theological' and that the other Gospels are not so. What *can* be maintained is that the Fourth Gospel is more fully pervaded by 'theological' faith or conviction than the others. And that this statement is true is as obvious to the most simple-minded as to the most philosophic Christian reader of to-day. *All the time* the Fourth Evangelist is thinking of the Eternal, the 'theological,' message which he believes to be inherent in the Person about whom he is writing. *All the time* he remembers that it is a 'Gospel' he is writing, and there can be no 'Gospel' which is not a 'Gospel' *of God*.

Hoskyns' position is that this 'theology' is inseparable from the historical facts and that it is a futile proceeding for the modern student to seek to distinguish the two. He rightly says of a true commentary on the Fourth Gospel:

> 'It must endeavour to hear and set forth the Meaning which the author of the Gospel has himself heard and seen in the concrete, historical life and death of Jesus of Nazareth, in His separate actions and in His audible words.'

But from this position—representing, as is obvious, a definitely 'historical' and 'psychological' endeavour on the part of the commentator—he leaps to the position of the futility of seeking to distinguish the 'history' from the 'interpretation,' and, further, to the position that the original 'theology,' whatever it was, must be accepted as sacrosanct. It is because I believe that neither of these latter positions is defensible that I regard the 'theological' position of Hoskyns neither as satisfying nor as likely to be of any permanent value 'in the present distress.'

Following the above-quoted words Hoskyns writes:

> 'The purpose of this commentary is to barricade the roads which seek to solve the problem either by regarding this Meaning as an idea of the author or as something which itself belongs to the mere hearing or sight of an eyewitness, regarded as historian, for in that case his faith would be not merely irrelevant, but actually suspect, since the eyewitness who believed could not be accepted as an impartial witness. The purpose of this commentary is also to barricade the roads which lead to a disentangling of history and interpretation. This triple barricading does not, however, originate in some perversity of the author of this commentary, but because these barricades have been erected by the original author of the book, and the meaning of his book must remain closed to those who tear down the barricades which he has so carefully erected. Did we say that he had "erected" these barricades? No, we must not say this. He found the barricades there already, for he is persuaded that the meaning which he has heard does veritably lie in the history.'

In reply to this it must be pointed out that Hoskyns does not himself acquiesce before the 'barricades' erected either by himself or, as he thinks, by the author of the Gospel. In addition to the passages already quoted, I could instance from every page of the commentary where Hoskyns definitely does (1) try to read 'this Meaning as an idea of the author,' and (2) declare, even though obscurely, his judgment about the 'historical' facts. No one can comment on any author's book without treating it as the expression of the author's ideas. It matters not whether they be regarded as derived from some other historical person or persons: inasmuch as the author has expressed them they must be taken as his by the commentator—unless the hypothesis be preferred that the author is a gramophone record. Nor can anyone comment intelligently on any author's book without seeking to distinguish between the historical facts and the interpretation indwelling the mind of the author. I have never read a commentary which does not ignore the three-fold barricade described by Hoskyns. His own commentary is no exception.

I myself believe—and I have stated it at length elsewhere—that 'the meaning which the Fourth Evangelist has heard does veritably lie' in the life and teaching of Jesus. I do not pretend, however, that this is not a 'historical' and 'psychological' judgment. I believe, with Hoskyns, that the Fourth Evangelist was 'persuaded' that this was so. But this 'persuasion' did not drop ready-made from the sky into the Evangelist's mind, nor did it descend there with a kind of authoritarian *fiat* from a

community. It was a 'persuasion,' as Hoskyns well says. What 'veritably lies in the history' has to be seen or believed by someone before he can even say *what it is* that 'lies in the history.'

It is for this reason that Hoskyns' endeavour to find some 'veritable "theological" meaning' in the Fourth Gospel apart from the thought, experience, or faith (and it matters not at this point which word is used) of the Evangelist himself is doomed to failure before it even begins. He is continually saying things like this: 'The Evangelist is confident that he is setting forth the veritable meaning of the Gospel and not some speculation of his own about it.' I agree that the Evangelist is thus 'confident': but I cannot overlook the fact that the Evangelist *is* 'confident.' There is no abstract 'theological' content unrelated to historical minds — whether the mind of the historic Jesus, the minds of the first disciples, or the mind of the Johannine Evangelist.

For that reason I cannot follow Hoskyns in his endeavour to isolate what he calls 'the realm of theological thought' either from a 'rigid historical conservatism' or from a free historical radicalism. I believe here that English thought—whether conservative or liberal — is much truer, much more true to reality, than the varieties of Continental thought which are so evident in Hoskyns' pages. And while I do not share the 'rigid historical conservatism' which has characterized so much English writing on the Fourth Gospel, I believe that it was the soundest of instincts which led men like Westcott and Bernard to see that theological truth and historical inquiry are most intimately related. The danger now is that while English conservatives deny the findings of historical inquiry, continental conservatives deny their relevance. I am reminded here of a remark once made in my presence by a Barthian New Testament critic. Speaking of the 'Christ-Myth' theory, which I had declared to be 'the vagary of eccentric critics,' he declared, 'It *may be* true.' Such a reply seems to me to spring from a more fundamentally sceptical view of Christianity than that of the sceptical historian.

No satisfying Christian theology—such, at least, is my own view — can ever sit down before a barricade which declares to the historical inquirer, 'Thus far and no further.' To change the figure: those who affirm that the knots of historical enquiry

cannot be untied, or that there is no need to untie them, are setting out to construct a Christian theology which is based on historical scepticism. If we appeal to historical, psychological and literary inquiry its verdict must not be evaded by retreating to the realm of the 'meta-historical.' The labours of the last generations of students of the Gospels have not been in vain. There is much in the Gospels which *every* student knows is not 'historical.' Let us not seek to disguise this fact, nor try to find rest for our tired minds and waning faith in a theological island of the blest. There is no such island. 'Theology' cannot be kept in splendid isolation from the results of historical inquiry: at least, any theology so kept is doomed to extinction in the minds of all thoughtful men. Historical inquiry and theological inquiry are inextricably interwoven, and he who would proscribe the first not only proscribes the second but renders its pretended results illusory and vain.

When real faith returns to humanity and the tempests of totalitarian or authoritarian systems — whether in State or in thought — have subsided, we shall see that 'theologies' are caravanserais in which men have found refuge and strength in a journey to a goal not yet attained. The supreme debt of those who undertake this journey is to the Person about whom the Fourth Evangelist wrote in terms which, as I believe, will never be out-moded. This Person was a historical person, and we do know, as I believe, the main lineaments of His life and His teaching. It is this knowledge which enables us to agree with our Evangelist when he regards Him as the Incarnate *Word*, or *Deed*, or the Eternal God whom no man had ever seen in the flesh or ever would so see. And in this journey the faithful can rely — again the Johannine message indwelling the teaching of the Person about whom he wrote — upon the Spirit of Truth which is the Spirit of the Living God.

. . . . . .

I have departed from the specific task of reviewing Sir Edwyn Hoskyns' book. The departure, however, is in keeping with a discussion of the central issue raised by the commentary. My final word must be to acknowledge the learned and stimulating quality of his contribution to the understanding of the greatest religious book ever written.

AN ENGLISH EIGHTEENTH CENTURY MYSTIC

By the Editor.

IT is a great pity that William Law is not read more to-day both by the clergy and by the educated laity. No one who reads him resolutely can fail to be influenced by him. Three of his greatest eighteenth century contemporaries, John Wesley, Samuel Johnson and Edward Gibbon—men extraordinarily different in their religious temperament—spoke of the quality of his writings with an admiration approaching reverence. John Wesley, in a biting criticism of some features of Law's mysticism, wrote:

> 'It will be easily allowed by impartial judges that there are few writers in the present age who stand in competition with Mr. Law as to beauty and strength of language, readiness, liveliness, and copiousness of thought and (in many points) accuracy of sentiment, . . . several of his treatises must remain, as long as English stands, almost unequalled standards of the strength and purity of our language as well as of sound practical divinity' (p. viii).

Boswell wrote of Johnson:

> 'He much commended "Law's *Serious Call*," which he said was the finest piece of hortatory theology in any language.'

Gibbon, whose father had been tutored by Law, wrote:

> 'His precepts are rigid but they are founded on the Gospel. His satire is sharp; but it is drawn from the knowledge of human life, and many of his portraits are not unworthy of the pen of La Bruyère. If he finds a spark of piety in his reader's mind, he will soon fan it into a flame; and a philosopher must allow that he exposes, with equal severity and truth, the strange contradiction between the faith and practice of the Christian world.'

In our own age two great Churchmen very unlike each other, Bishop Gore and Dean Inge, have both strongly recommended Law's *Serious Call* as the best book for Lenten reading.

But the greatest writers remain unread by later generations unless recalled to living memory by the pious endeavours of editors, commentators and publishers who undertake the republication of our classics. Dr. Alexander Whyte, an influential Scottish preacher now hardly remembered, did much to arouse interest in William Law's writings in late Victorian days by his

readable *Characters and Characteristics of William Law, Non-Juror and Mystic*, published in 1893.

In our own day this task of popularizing Law has been undertaken by Mr. Stephen Hobhouse. His *William Law and Eighteenth Century Quakerism* appeared in 1927.[1] This was followed by *Selected Mystical Writings of William Law* in 1938.[2] Mr. Stephen Hobhouse seems to us to be one of the most modest, conscientious and diligent of editors. Himself he never obtrudes, and his whole endeavour is to expound Law's teaching critically in relation to the teaching of Law's religious contemporaries and immediate predecessors, and also to elucidate Law's point of view in one passage of his writings by reference to similar views expressed in other passages. This demands not simply an accurate knowledge of contemporary religious thought, but also a most exacting study of all Law's treatises comprised in the nine solid volumes of his collected works.

Law (1686-1761) graduated at Emmanuel College, Cambridge. He was ordained a clergyman of the Church of England but became a non-Juror. Thereafter he led a retired life at King's Cliffe, Northamptonshire, his birthplace. He was that very remarkable thing, an eighteenth century English saint in Holy Orders, and yet by no means nearly so rare as the detractors of the English religious life of the eighteenth century would lead us to suppose. What particularly characterized the English saintship of the eighteenth century was sanity, whether in Joseph Addison, Bishop Butler or John Wesley. It admired simplicity but scorned asceticism. It cultivated personal service and generous philanthropy. It possessed very little ecclesiastical sense and made sparing use of sacraments. All these characteristics are seen in William Law. He comes, if we may use William James' classification, in the class, not of the twice-born, but of the once-born. From an early age he experienced a deepening sense of the moral and spiritual quality of human life. This, some would hold, reached its climax when he published his *Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life* in 1728, but in 1740 he came under the influence of Jacob Boehme's mystical writings. This impact of German mysticism on English piety is

[1] Allen and Unwin. 12*s*. 6*d*. 1927.
[2] Daniel. 8*s*. 6*d*. 1938.

a remarkable feature of eighteenth century religious life in England. It is of course most conspicuous in the influence of Count Zinzendorf and the Moravians on the Wesleys.

The influence of Boehme on Law led the latter to emphasize guidance of the Holy Spirit in the life of the individual Christian. The religious rationalism of the age failed for the most part to appreciate the development's of Law's religious teaching which took place as the result of his mystical experience. The Law of the *Serious Call*, plain Englishmen, like Dr. Johnson, understood and valued. And the moral and religious standard of their life was in consequence definitely raised. The Law of the *Spirit of Love*, the noblest example of his mystical writings (Dean Inge calls it Law's masterpiece), was misunderstood by many and even condemned by some. For instance, John Wesley was deeply pained by its Quakerism. Yet the profound and universal quality of its insight and experience can leave little doubt that it is the herald of the Christian religion of the future. When the Christian Church of an age which is yet to come realizes the quality and character of the Christian religion which Law there expounds, many of the troubles which it has created for itself and mankind will be at an end. We should, however, advise those who know nothing of William Law, as a writer, to begin with his *Serious Call*, which combines the qualities of a literary masterpiece with those of a religious classic. The delicacy and insight with which different religious and irreligious persons are there depicted give a liveliness and human interest to a book of religion such as we experience in reading John Bunyan's masterpieces and Blaise Pascal's *Provincial Letters*. 'The most beautiful of all the character sketches,' to cite Dean Inge again, is Ouranius. This picture of an ideal eighteenth century clergyman deserves to rank with Oliver Goldsmith's 'village preacher' of Auburn or Geoffrey Chaucer's 'poorè parson of a town.'

> 'But Christès lore, and His apostles twelve
> He taught, but first he follow'd it himselve.'

Law's third great religious treatise is *The Spirit of Prayer*. Of Part I of this treatise Mr. Stephen Hobhouse writes:

> 'This Part I had gone into seven editions, and it has been several times reprinted by members of the Quaker body, with whom it was a

special favourite for its insistence on the light within, the hidden seed of Christ, and the need of inward silence.'

Of the dialogues which constitute Part II, Dr. Alexander Whyte wrote that they are 'productions of nothing less than a Platonic depth and beauty.'

It must be confessed that Law had a taste for religious controversy, and religious controversy is much less interesting to those who read it than to those who indulge in it. Also, and it could not be otherwise, Law's learning and intellectual equipment, not his spiritual insight, reflect the limitations of his age. For example, his criticism of Bishop Warburton's *The Divine Legation of Moses Demonstrated*, will strike the modern student, versed in *Studia Biblica* and Comparative Religion, as being as much astray as the doughty prelate whom he criticizes.

In the year of his death Law published *An Address to the Clergy*. This is as well worth reading to-day as Bishop Butler's famous Charge. Of this treatise Mr. Stephen Hobhouse writes :

> 'Its central theme, again and again emphasised, is that the immediate and continual inspiration of God's Spirit is essential to the life of the Christian, and that it is the absence of any desire for this and of any faith in its possibility, together with the pursuit of profane learning, that is responsible for most of the ills afflicting the Christian world, including the greatest of all, the curse of war. Despite a certain diffuseness of style, the book is written with an amazing vigour for a man of seventy-four who was about to die a natural death' (p. 289).

Law's message to the Church of his own day and to ours is summarized in the following citation from his writings :

> 'For the Truth of Christianity is the Spirit of God living and working in it; and where this Spirit is not the Life of it, there the outward Form is but like the outward Carcase of a departed soul.'

IN MEMORIAM

JOHN RICHARD WILKINSON

ON April 25th, St. Mark's Day, after an illness of some months, there passed from among us John Richard Wilkinson, Rector of Winford, Prebendary of Wells Cathedral and Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Bath and Wells. He had gone up to Oxford as a mathematical scholar of Worcester College in 1884. After taking Firsts in Mathematics, in which he took his degree in 1887, he stayed on to read 'Greats.' He

was ordained by the Bishop of London in 1891 and served three London curacies. During this period he continued his studies, making great use of the Reading Room at the British Museum. His study of the Bible had led him quite early to see the importance of a thoroughly critical investigation of the Gospel records, and from this time onwards he devoted his great powers to this line of research. In realizing the crucial importance of a really scientific study of the Gospels he was ahead of most English scholars of his time, and he made it the main task of his life.

In 1903 his old College presented him to the living of Winford in Somerset, a village some six miles south of Bristol on the Mendip Hills. Here for thirty-seven years he served faithfully and devotedly his flock of eight hundred souls. It was not long before the clergy in his neighbourhood discovered that they had among them a scholar of real eminence, though to most of them his contributions seemed to be of an alarming and disturbing nature. Their minds were unaccustomed to and indeed unaware of this new line of study. *Lux Mundi* had prepared them to accept a certain degree of criticism of the Old Testament narratives, but the Gospels were altogether another matter. It was inevitable under the circumstances that there should be disapproval and opposition. However, Wilkinson's deep reverence and the shining qualities of his beautiful character gained him a hearing in wider circles as time went on. He left no stone unturned to make himself master of the growing mass of scholarly contributions to the investigation of the Synoptic Problem, and he let nothing of importance escape him. He became a real 'expert' in his subject.

While in London he had been elected a member of the 'Curates' Clerical Club,' at whose meetings he had made a considerable impression. Later he became a valued member of the London 'Society for the Study of Religion,' where he numbered among his friends the late eminent scholars Baron von Hügel and Dr. C. G. Montefiore. His advice was sought on questions relating to his own special study by such men of learning as the late Dr. Rashdall, who pays his tribute to Wilkinson in his Bampton Lectures and other works. In Somerset a small group of clergy had discovered the hidden treasure in their midst and formed a class or study-circle under his inspiring guidance,

meeting once a month at his Rectory, where he proved his great qualities as a teacher and where he gave of his best. It was not in pulpit or on platform but in the class-room of study that his great abilities had full scope and where he was in his element. He was not only a faithful parish priest, but gave great public service on his District Council and was a valued helper and supporter of the Bristol University Settlement. In 1925 Bishop Wynne Willson gave public recognition to his great abilities by making him a Prebendary of Wells and one of his Examining Chaplains. This opened to him further spheres of influence which were long overdue.

No account of Wilkinson would give any idea of his influence which failed to mention the impression he made on all who came into intimate contact with him. He possessed a spirit of great courage, a sensitive and reverent passion for truth, utter selflessness, an immense capacity for taking pains about anything he undertook, especially when it was to help others, a fine sense of humour and power of sympathy, a quick appreciation of all fine and noble things, and that indefinable charm and attractiveness which men call 'Christian.' Indeed, those of us who had the privilege of studying with him over a period of years could not help but notice that the portrait of the historic Jesus which he unveiled was reflected in no small measure in the life of him who was our guide. He was possessed of a most unusual sanity and clear vision of fact. In his studies he could move safely amid the bewildering fusillade of theories built up on flimsy fancies which seem to fascinate very often the brains of clever and less balanced minds, gaining for them a brief reputation before passing into oblivion. He held fast that which was good and never allowed himself to be side-tracked into fanciful speculations which had no real evidence for their support. He was a most outstanding example of a deepened faith in the essential verity of the Christian revelation after a ruthless and thorough scientific criticism of its credentials. So far from this faith being a thin and emasculated residuum, it was deeper and more secure because so well based upon reliable foundations. It was a faith that had nothing to fear from reason and criticism, but able to give a thoroughly good account of itself from whatever quarter the attack might come. It was just the

faith that was needed to carry those who have it, bold and undismayed in these difficult times and the probably still more difficult times to come. There are a considerable number of people who have reason to thank God for the gift of John Richard Wilkinson.

He has left behind him no original published work except the six volumes of Harnack's New Testament Studies which he translated for the Crown Theological Library, and a small work of Arnold Meyer in Harper's 'Library of Living Thought.' Was there not a strange appropriateness that one who had done so much to illuminate the Marcan document should receive his call to the higher service on St. Mark's Day?

C. E. Seamer.

Shapwick Vicarage.

BOOK REVIEWS

ANGLICAN PREACHING *

Dr. Henson in his recent book on the Church of England (p. 239) expressed little hope for the future of preaching, an opinion which deserves careful attention as coming from one of the few occupants of an episcopal throne in this century who have achieved any fame for ability in the pulpit.

> 'Modern conditions,' he writes, 'tend to enfeeble the Churches which magnify the pulpit, but to leave unaffected the influence of the altar. The Protestant exaltation of the preacher's function was a source of strength so long as society was settled, but it has become a source of weakness since society has become, beyond all precedent, fluid. The development of society has robbed the pulpit of much of its importance, both as limiting its range and by creating rivals in its sphere. The Press and the Platform, to which must now be added Broadcasting, have taken over much of its work. Preachers can never again wield the social or political authority which attached to them when "tuning the pulpits" was a part of State policy which not even the strongest statesman could afford to neglect. In any case, the preacher's influence is bound up with the habit of public worship, itself inseparable from Sunday observance. Both presuppose a society which is stable, resident from father to son in the same place, governed by tradition, coloured and led by personal example. If the Sunday be secularised, and the churches empty, if the close-knit fellowship of immemorial neighbourhood lose reality, and men live as strangers in the places where they rather pernoctate than reside, it needs no argument to show that the preacher's opportunity has vanished, and his function been destroyed. No learning, ability, or devotion in the pulpit can wake response from empty pews. The preacher's *raison d'être* is a congregation. If the last has disappeared, the first has no apparent reason for remaining. When, however, Christianity has once been practically identified with the priest's ministry at the altar and in the

* *The Art of Preaching, a Practical Survey of Preaching in the Church of England* 747—1939. By Charles Smyth. (London: S.P.C.K. 1940. 8/6.)

confessional, it is apparent that it has been largely released from local attachments. There is no insuperable difficulty about effecting a *modus vivendi* between the Church and modern society. One altar is as effective as another: and the confessional may be everywhere available. Both appeal to fundamental human needs which may be satisfied by any priest anywhere. The elasticity of sacerdotalism matches with comparative facility the bewildering mobility of modern society.'

Nevertheless, next to the possession of a wife, the Anglican laity most desire in their incumbent ability in preaching. The clergy may argue that both these requirements are marks of vestigial Protestantism; that there is much to be said for sacerdotal celibacy and for a golden silence rather than a Chrysostom in the pulpit. But the laity continue to hope for good sermons, and prefer bad ones to none at all.

There are a number of works claiming to instruct the aspirant in preaching—Father Paul Bull's well-known manual, for example—but such works tend to become devotional manuals; being written by preachers, they do what so many manuals do, they edify but fail to inform.

The present work, as its title indicates, is a history of Anglican preaching, but aims at being useful to the practitioner as well as the literary student. Mr. Smyth states his aim clearly in the preface:

'This little work makes but few pretensions to what is called "original research." Anyone who has ever put this sort of book together knows how the thing is done. My indebtedness to the researches of Prof. Owst, of Father Charland, O.P., and of Mr. Fraser Mitchell of the University of Reading is undisguised, and I sincerely hope that it is obvious. On the other hand, I think that this book may claim a little credit for originality of treatment. Its terms of reference are other than those of previous investigators of the history of preaching. It studies the sermon literature of the period, not in order to illuminate the history of English literature or of English eloquence or of English social history, but in order to illuminate the past history and the present problems of the Ministry of the Word in England. Secondly, the period covered—747 to 1939—is, I think, a longer period than has been reviewed by any of those scholars to whose work I am so much indebted. Therefore, although this survey of preaching in the Church of England can hardly claim to have broken new ground, it can, I believe, claim to have driven a longer furrow than has previously been driven in this field. . . .

Finally, I hope that this book may be of use to two classes of readers: to parish priests, and to professional historians; to those who are interested in preaching, and to those who are interested in the history of preaching. Of the two, it is written primarily for the former: and I trust that for this very reason it may be the more useful to the latter. For the study of the language of the pulpit is the study of a living language: and a practical survey of Preaching in the Church of England is perhaps the only kind of survey that can meet the practical requirements even of those who are concerned with homiletics only as a branch of literature or of rhetoric.'

The reader should be warned against the author's claim to have written a continuous history of the English sermon from 747 to the present day.

747 is the date of the Council of Cloveshoo, at which the clergy were directed, among other things, to teach their people. The author ignores such Anglo-Saxon homilies as have survived, and admits that 'in any case, the history of the pulpit as we know it begins with the Preaching Friars' (p. 13). Actually the book consists of four essays, two on the medieval period, two entitled 'The triumph of Tillotson' and 'The Nineteenth Century and After.' The Reformation period is scarcely touched, and the seventeenth century is but briefly noticed, though the author makes it clear that the medieval style still prevailed and that the break came towards the end of the century. Mr. Smyth has been so far known for his work on the Reformation, and his omission of this period is also surprising since it was then that preaching came to be the main public duty of the clergy, then that the emphasis shifted from the ministry of the Sacraments to that of the Word, then that the demand arose for a learned clergy who could preach. Mr. Smyth does not explain the Puritanical influence responsible for tacking a sermon on to the Sunday Mattins and Evensong, so that the clergy groan under the burden of sermon preparation. Those ministers who conformed at the Restoration altered the balance of the service by the length of their addresses so that it became merely 'the preliminaries.' This magnification of the sermon was due to the Puritanical belief that people would become good if only they were exhorted to be good with sufficient frequency and vigour. The abortive 1928 Prayer-book omitted the direction in the Baptismal Office to the god-parents to see that the child heard sermons; the utility of the exercise was tacitly denied. A modern development unnoticed by the author has been the revival of the liturgical sermon owing to the supersession of Mattins by a choral Eucharist as the principal morning service in many churches; the type of preaching appropriate in such a context is in some way different from that which forms an appendix to Mattins or Evensong.

The chapters on the medieval sermon will interest those who desire a shorter account than that of Dr. Owst, but from the practical standpoint it seems doubtful if the study of medieval preaching is now of much value in view of the elaborate pedantry of its form and the trivial absurdity of its illustrations, apart from the general principle that a sermon constructed according to rule is likely to be better than one that is shapeless.

Mr. Smyth does not like Tillotson, but recognizes that modern English preaching begins with him.

> 'It will thus be apparent that the triumph of Tillotson meant the emancipation of the Anglican pulpit not only from the metaphysical but also from the Puritan tradition. It involved a breach, not only with the homiletic conventions of the Middle Ages, but also with the homiletic conventions of the immediate past. On the one hand, Tillotson abandoned the use of *exempla*; on the other, he rejected the almost mechanical reiteration of cant terms and phrases: for both alike he substituted the appeal to reason and to common sense, the

careful, comprehensive argument, solid, unhurried, unadorned. From the one, he rejected the stiff, formal pedantry which for centuries had governed the development of the preacher's theme: from the other, he rejected the illimitable divisions and subdivisions, the 'applications' and 'resolutions,' which marked the Scriptural sermons of the Presbyterian divines' (p. 146).

The final chapter is scarcely an adequate summary of preaching since 1800, but is full of useful, if sometimes eccentric, comment on modern tendencies. Mr. Smyth dares to attack Newman as writer and preacher: perhaps only an Anglo-Catholic and a Cambridge man would have had the audacity to do this. The one preacher who wins his unqualified approval is Robertson of Brighton; next he appears to value Liddon. It is a little queer to have Dr. Goudge singled out for commendation, especially when the example chosen is the sermon on Naaman in modern dress, which begins, if I remember aright, 'Sir Charles and Lady Naaman,' and continues in the same tasteless style.

Mr. Smyth is severe on certain modern tendencies in preaching:

'The one thing that may be said on behalf of the prudential morality which did duty for the Catholic Faith in the pulpits of the Hanoverian Establishment is that it was at least more beneficial and less intellectually contemptible than the loose emotional idealism, the moral uplift, the shop-soiled beatitudes from the bargain basement, which too often do duty for the Catholic Faith in much of the popular preaching and of the religious and pseudo-religious journalism of our own day and age. Nor need those Anglo-Catholic clergy hope to escape censure who pretend to preach Christ crucified and Him only, but do in fact preach nothing but the Church and the Sacraments (particularly the Sacrament of Penance)' (p. 163).

The author has nothing to say against the peculiar faults of Evangelical preaching, perhaps because with all its obvious deficiencies the Evangelical party has never depreciated sermons. Some of the most interesting pages of the book are devoted to Charles Simeon and his influence on the theory and practice of preaching:

'Simeon was very much concerned with the technique of preaching, and indeed devoted his incessant attention to it for forty years. He used to give classes in sermon composition in his rooms in King's which were gratefully attended by generations of undergraduates of the Evangelical persuasion. And when he died in 1836, he left behind him as his *magnum opus* and literary monument 21 volumes of sermon outlines for the use and inspiration of future generations of English preachers, the famous *Horae Homileticae*. It does not appear that these had anything like the influence that he had hoped and anticipated. That vast accumulation of dry bony skeletons, which it was left to the preacher to clothe, as Simeon himself had clothed them, with flesh and skin and features, could not but seem artificial and repugnant to those who had never heard their author in the pulpit. On the other hand, it would be difficult to exaggerate his personal influence on the development of Anglican homiletics through the individual Evangelical clergy-

men who, as undergraduates at Cambridge, had come under his tuition. Simeon was almost the first man in the history of the English pulpit since the Middle Ages to appreciate that it is perfectly possible to teach men how to preach, and to discover how to do so. If his *Horae Homileticae* are to-day as dead as a door-nail, the maxims which he inculcated at his Sermon Parties on alternate Friday evenings during Term are still exceedingly alive' (p. 175).

A specimen of Simeon's advice will explain his success as instructor in preaching:

> 'I do not advise any young minister to preach extempore until he has preached three or four hundred written sermons; until he has been at least three or four years preaching. Let him speak, meanwhile, extempore, in his workhouse or school-room addresses, the same sermon which he has delivered in church from writing. He will thus acquire the habit of speaking easily and efficiently. After a few years, let him drop the fully written sermon for copious notes, and then gradually pass to extempore speaking. Carefully let him avoid anything like slovenly preparation. Let his extempore preaching be neither the result nor the cause of indolence. To begin extempore preaching too soon is likely to lead to crudeness of style. Never forget that you have to win souls. It takes more time to prepare properly for an extempore sermon than to write one. There are but few good extempore preachers in England, because men do not devote sufficient time and effort to preparation. Evangelical preachers too often take routine texts, which they may easily prate about, but comparatively seldom choose texts which require study and thinking over.'

The reader might have looked for some comparison of Anglican with Dissenting and Scottish preaching, and for illustration of the theme from the not infrequent allusions to sermons in English literature (this latter might afford a subject to one desirous of composing a Ph.D. thesis), but Mr. Smyth has written a book that in spite of its obvious limitations can scarcely fail to interest anyone who preaches or desires to learn to preach.

P. R. Smythe.

THE VOICE OF THE WORLD-WIDE CHURCH*

At Tambaram near Madras in December 1938 there was gathered together the most oecumenical Christian Council which has ever been held. The 471 men and women who came to the Conference were predominantly nationals of the 69 countries from which they came, whereas earlier missionary conferences have had a majority of missionaries. A short account of the subjects discussed, with the Findings of the Conference, was published early in 1939 for 1/6 under the title of *The World Mission of the Church*. English readers who are not connected intimately with the mission field

* *The World Mission of the Church.* Findings and recommendations of the Meeting of the International Missionary Council at Tambaram, Madras, December 1938. (Published by the International Missionary Council, London and New York. 1939. 1/6. *Tambaram Madras Series,* 7 vols. Oxford University Press. 30/-.)

may hesitate to order a copy fearing that it will be restricted to problems that only face the younger Churches; for obviously one whose business it is, say, to study the Christian problems of labour and capital in large Western cities can scarcely be expected also to make a serious study of the methods of tackling adult illiteracy. Such a one would be mistaken. For while of necessity local problems had to be discussed, other problems were such as relate to the world-wide Church. Nor is it sufficient to say that we at home can adequately discuss the problems, such as those of the Ministry, Church and State, and International Relations, which concern us. For these problems are not peculiar to the West, and they were dealt with at Tambaram with a breadth of view unattainable in England, a view as wide as the stretch from China to Brazil and thence to Japan. We pride ourselves in these days on being internationally minded; and in Church affairs we never tire of asserting our membership of the Universal Church. Yet in our ecclesiastical and theological thinking we pay practically no attention to the opinions of Christians outside Europe and America. Those who have studied the greatest of all English commentaries, Sanday and Headlam's *Romans,* may remember that the authors, after giving a list of the English and European works consulted, added with a touch of pride, 'We are glad to have been able to refer, through the kindness of a friend, to a Russian commentary.' Besides that, two American authors have been consulted, and one Asiatic, St. John of Damascus of the eighth century. Sanday and Headlam wrote in 1895. Since then the world has become smaller and the Church bigger. The younger Churches, still faced with the struggle for existence in the face of great non-Christian majorities, are in many particulars more aware of the miraculous workings of the Spirit than the long-established Churches of the West; the difference between Christian and non-Christian is clearer; the fruits of the Spirit more obvious. With a later start in education, the younger Churches for a long time lacked the power to express their new experiences in writing. But the position is rapidly changing, and now there are Christians to be found in India, China and Japan who are the equals of our Western professors as exponents of the faith they hold. A friend of the reviewer, who had bought a copy of the short Report, was told by someone who ought to have known better, that by the time he had read it he would not want to read the full Report. Seven volumes, even when they can be got for thirty shillings the set, are rather staggering to contemplate. But the reviewer's own experience is that reading the Findings of the Short Report makes one turn with greater eagerness to learn from the full Report the variety of views that went to the framing of the Findings, and the considered opinions to which those who were present were led *after* they had heard what the others had said. The seven volumes contain not only a report of what happened at Tambaram, and the conclusions accepted by the whole Conference, but also the conclusions drawn by many of the leaders after the Conference was over.

Anyone whose work is connected directly or indirectly with the Church overseas will find interest in all the volumes. Those whose work is restricted to home activities will very probably not have time or inclination to study Vol. III, which deals with the methods of evangelism in non-Christian countries; Vol. IV, which deals with the life of the younger Churches, or Vol. V on their economic problems. But there remain four volumes which cannot fail to be of interest to everyone who values his position as a member of the Universal Church. Vol. II gives in quick succession a series of short chapters describing just what progress Christianity is making in many different lands. It is the very thing for those who have no time to study the magazines and reports which are continually coming in from the mission field, and yet want to know, for their own sakes, or for the sake of their congregations if they are clergy, what is actually being achieved. Vol. VII contains addresses by various people, including such subjects as the Meaning of the Cross, by Kagawa; the Church and the International Order, by T. Z. Koo; Inter-racial Reconciliation, by the late C. F. Andrews; Church and State, by the Bishop of Winchester. 'Church and State,' a problem both religious and political, has a volume to itself, Vol. VI, and includes valuable reports on the condition of affairs in Latin America, the U.S.S.R., the Balkan States, and the Muslim world. Of the greatest universal interest, particularly to theologians, is Vol. I on the 'Authority of the Faith.' The articles in this volume are: Continuity or Discontinuity, by Dr. Kraemer of Leiden, who has been closely connected with the development and expansion of Christianity in Muslim Java; Revelation, by Prof. T. C. Chao of China; the Problem of Truth in Religion, by Prof. Moses of Nagpur; the Johannine Approach, by Dr. Reichelt of China; the Christian Attitude to non-Christian Faith, by Dr. Hogg, late of Madras; the Biblical View of Religion, by Missionsdirektor Hartenstein of Basel; Between Hocking and Kraemer, by Prof. W. M. Horton of Oberlin, U.S.A.; and the Authority of the Faith, by Prof. H. H. Farmer of Cambridge. In this volume at any rate there is nothing of merely passing or local interest, and it certainly contains contributions of the greatest value on one of the vital problems of Christian thought.

L. E. BROWNE.

A SACRAMENTAL UNIVERSE *

Professor Scott has done a service in making available some of the unpublished work of the late Professor Bowman of Glasgow. Professor Kemp Smith has already edited his *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion*, so that students of philosophy can now know something of the work of a very remarkable man, whose death in 1936 was a tragic loss. Professor Bowman seems to have been an example of a type of philosopher whom our

* *A Sacramental Universe.* The Vanuxem Lectures. By A. A. Bowman. Edited by J. W. Scott. (Princeton University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. pp. xxviii+411. Price 22/6 net.)

generation hardly produces any longer—what Aristotle would have called ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδεύμενος. The present work reveals an astonishingly wide knowledge of different sides of modern science, as well as of linguistic studies. Professor Kemp Smith also tells how Bowman, when a prisoner of war in Germany during the Great War, proved himself a veritable Faculty of Arts in his own person, and organized classes for his fellow-prisoners in which he lectured extensively from memory on English, German and Russian Literature, and Roman History. The Bishop of Southampton, who was one of his fellow-prisoners, tells how Bowman came to him one day and said, 'Padré, I ought as a soldier to escape—I have a good chance, as I speak German. It might be my duty to kill a sentry, as it is his to kill me—we are soldiers. But they tell me I can bribe them with chocolate or soap. What do you think? I somehow don't feel I can; it is worse than killing, it is wounding their souls.' This is typical of his reflections on the ethical problems of war — reflections which, coming from a man of his calibre, we read with special eagerness now. But the present volume contains little of these matters of more personal and general interest. The main bulk of it is made up of a closely-reasoned discussion of the nature of 'subjective systems' and their relation to the physical world. The discussion is technical and of such a close nature that any criticisms I could make would have to be somewhat protracted and take me beyond the limits of this review. One task Bowman was attempting seems to have been to restate some of the essential points in the idealist logic of internal relations within a system in terms of the newer logic of relations of functional dependence — a task which those of us who do not believe that the idealist logic is now entirely 'on the shelf' will recognize to be a most important one. There is also a valuable critical discussion of naturalistic theories of consciousness, including a form of naturalism so Platonic as those of Whitehead and Santayana. I should want to defend Whitehead against the charge of being as 'naturalistic' as Bowman represents him (the discussion is based almost entirely on Whitehead's earlier work up to *Process and Reality*). In representing Whitehead as holding that the unity of a system of events consists simply in the unity of a formal character, he overlooks his doctrine of 'subjective aim.' Moreover, he does not consider the importance of the theory of 'presentational immediacy' in Whitehead's theory of perception, which describes the capacity of a subject to use symbols in a way which ought not, surely, to be described as 'behaviouristic.' Also he does not consider the efforts Whitehead has made in his later books to get over the dualism of 'objects' and 'events.' Against this dualism as it appears in the earlier books, Bowman's criticism seems cogent—the modifications in *Process and Reality* show that Whitehead himself was dissatisfied with it, but how far he has succeeded in producing a convincing alternative is another matter.

DOROTHY M. EMMET.

FIFTY YEARS OF PSYCHICAL RESEARCH*

Spiritualism, or Psychical Research, to give this subject the name used by those who study it scientifically, attracts to-day a good deal of attention. Some are drawn to it by the hope of getting into touch with dead friends or relatives. The last war produced Sir Oliver Lodge's *Raymond*, and this war may be expected to have similar results. But others study Psychical Research from the purely scientific standpoint. They want to know the facts. Sensational accounts appear of the achievements of well-known mediums. Are any of these phenomena genuine? Mediums have often been caught cheating. Some have openly said that they would trick if they got the chance. Are all mediums tricksters, or can some of them produce phenomena under conditions which prevent fraud?

The Society for Psychical Research was founded about fifty years ago to answer these questions. A famous President of the Society, Professor Henry Sidgwick, said in 1882 :

> 'It is a scandal that the dispute as to the reality of these phenomena should still be going on. The primary aim of our society is to make a sustained and systematic attempt to remove this scandal in one way or another.'

Mr. Price in *Fifty Years of Psychical Research* has written the story of this attempt. His book is authoritative and most interesting. Secretary of the Society for Psychical Research for many years, he has examined and, one must add, exposed more mediums than any man living. But his book is much more than a record of exposed frauds. He describes much more than he says he can explain. In a most interesting concluding chapter, 'I Believe,' he says he is sure some of the phenomena produced by the best mediums are genuine. He believes in haunted houses, ghosts, materializations and other psychical phenomena. But his final appeal is to the scientists. In spite of fifty years of scientific study and research, the scandal which the S.P.R. was founded to remove still continues. Orthodox science still refuses to take Psychical Research seriously. Perhaps some scientists are afraid that if they do they will burn their fingers. At a séance a conjuror is better able to detect a fraudulent medium than a scientist. Recently, chiefly through Mr. Price, a laboratory for psychical experiment has been established at London University, together with a library. Mr. Price concludes his appeal to scientists with the words of Kelvin :

> 'Science is bound by the everlasting law of honour to face fearlessly every problem that can fairly be presented to it.'

Mr. Price reviews Psychical Research from the standpoint of science. What has the subject to do with religion? Spiritualists say, everything. They claim to be in touch with the Spirit World, and are not moral and spiritual values the subject of religion? In the Gospel story the Trans-

* *Fifty Years of Psychical Research.* By H. Price. (Longmans. 1939. 10/6.)

figuration and especially the Resurrection are made more credible and more easily understood by the Spiritualist hypothesis. At the Resurrection the disciples really seem to have seen Christ's spiritual manifestation; they were sure He had survived death, and His survival convinced them of their own survival. In our own day spiritualists believe they have received similar proofs of human survival. But the connexion of Spiritualism with religion is much slighter than one might suppose. Several eminent members of the S.P.R. have believed in survival but not in God. The most religiously gifted people of the ancient world, the Jews, would have nothing to do with Spiritualism. 'Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live' (*Ex.* xxii. 18); and the official attitude of the Roman Church is similarly hostile. Mr. Price's book shows that genuine psychical phenomena are too rare, too casual and too obscure in their significance to permit Spiritualism to be a valuable support to religion, much less to become a real religion on its own account. Spiritualism appeals to those who like the unusual, the uncanny, the marvellous. It occupies the place which miracles used to hold in popular religion. But real knowledge of God comes to us from other sources; and even the belief in immortality, with which Spiritualists are so much concerned, rests most securely on the known nature of God and of man, not on the rare and often doubtful phenomena produced by mediums at séances.

J. K. NETTLEFOLD.

CREATIVE CHRISTIANITY*

Nicolas Berdyaev is in the true line of prophets. His latest book, *The Destiny of Man*, vibrates with the sense of some new thing to be done, some new idea to be conceived, if civilization is to be saved. What this consists of, and how it is to be achieved, he, in common with all great prophets, cannot say in so many precise words. But this is the very nature of prophecy: concerned with reality, it never can find adequate speech. To those not in tune with the prophetic mind, a book of this kind will seem to be written in a foreign language; to others, every phrase will be crystal clear, so familiar, indeed, that it might have sprung from their own thoughts; in addition, and most important of all, the fertilizing power of the writing will give birth to innumerable conceptions and impulses in the minds of other writers and thinkers. This may be said to be its pre-eminent quality, and possibly its final value.

The hidebound philosopher and theologian will find much to disagree with in ideas so throbbing with vitality, with newness and creativeness, concerned so much more with the future than the decaying past. M. Berdyaev's thought moves restlessly in the unsatisfactory present, pointing always to a possible new order, a new and vital ideology. There is scarcely a single area left unexplored: economics, sociology, art, ethics, psychology,

* *The Destiny of Man.* By Nicolas Berdyaev. (Geoffrey Bles. 1937. 16/-.)

and everywhere he finds the old order not necessarily bad, but inadequate. Christianity comes alive in a way that should bring about the revolution the Christian world recognizes as the only hope of salvation. Briefly, the first essential is a new, original, honest approach to every problem concerning man. Second-hand ideas, glibly accepted notions, will not do. It is not enough to agree with commonplace moral concepts, or even with the usual Christian doctrines; each must be thought out anew. The destiny of man is every man's concern: especially is it the concern of the artist, the philosopher and the theologian. But clearly, since redemption is still far from us, there is a whole universe of knowledge that remains hidden. To this universe M. Berdyaev points us: if he cannot exactly show the way, he does at least passionately affirm the existence of such a universe and the necessity for its discovery. He says plainly what many contemporary thinkers believe without having been able adequately to formulate the belief: the true laws, the final wisdom, have been lost, and must be found again. The whole world, since that moment of loss, is out of joint. The scientist, Alexis Carrel, in his book *Man, the Unknown*, proclaims a similar belief, though his approach is necessarily very different, though scarcely less valuable. When M. Berdyaev speaks of 'an inner creative act of love for a person, *unexpressed in any way as yet*,'[1] we recognize at once the direction of his thinking: the redemption of humanity by means apprehended by certain minds, but at present incapable of formulation, *as yet* unexpressed. But the history of human thought is still in its infancy; for the moment it must be enough to know that hope lies in the unknown, and that here and there minds come into being which are able to press further into future possibilities and point a direction.

The chapter on 'The Ethics of Redemption' is a good example of creative Christian thinking:

> 'When man accepts suffering and recognizes that it has a meaning, the pain grows less, becomes more endurable, and a light begins to shine through it. Unenlightened suffering, the most terrible of all, is that which man does not accept, against which he rebels and feels vindictive. But when he accepts suffering as having a higher value, it regenerates him. This is the meaning of the Cross' (p. 153).

This draws a careful distinction, inevitably stressed by the Christian, between the two kinds of suffering, the creative and the destructive. In this same chapter he writes finely of optimism and pessimism: pessimism is metaphysically right, optimism flat and superficial, since a complete view of life cannot deny the overwhelming facts of suffering, every kind of pain, tragedy, disaster. But Christianity teaches something better than optimism: the acceptance of and redemption through these overwhelming facts.

> Suffering is closely connected with freedom . . .
> All life in this world means bearing the Cross.
> And I must bear not only my own cross, but my neighbour's.

[1] The italics are mine.

And this for no thought of 'reward' — a charge sometimes ignorantly brought against the 'promises' of Christianity — but because the acceptance, the bearing of the Cross, is in itself mysteriously creative, of infinite value to the whole destiny of man. Throughout the book, the author's passionate concern is with this ultimate freedom: 'Man must be spiritually free, even if he is in prison.'

The long chapter on 'Concrete Problems of Ethics' goes to the very roots of spiritual, ethical and moral conflict:

> 'The important point is that no law or norm can help . . . The law does not recognize tragedy, it knows only the categories of good and evil' (p. 198).

And, as M. Berdyaev so truly points out, the profoundly tragic inner conflicts are beyond good and evil, beyond morality and the law. They are concerned with man's true freedom, and consequent redemption:

> 'If a man is conscious of himself as a free and creative spirit, he will make the solution of the tragic conflicts of life depend upon his freedom and creativeness and not upon a uniform and universally binding law. He will sacrifice one value for the sake of another' (p. 199).

This means placing upon man precisely the kind of responsibility few are willing to accept. The easier way is to live according to the law, without questioning the final truth of its edicts.

> 'We have pure tragedy when a free personality is confronted with a choice between conflicting values.'

'Pure' tragedy — here he makes a fine and necessary distinction between the various types of tragedy. To this understanding, the true, unsullied, sheer tragedy arises only when there is a confiict between supreme values; a choice of two goods, *not* a choice — which is, by comparison, simple — between good and evil. These tragedies occur only when man is spiritually free: 'for freedom is not satisfaction, delight and ease, but pain, toil and difficulty.' Throughout this chapter he carefully points the difference between true and false conceptions of, for example, such values as sexual love, family love, religious beliefs, art, happiness:

> 'The herd-morality, concerned with masses and averages, prevents the upward flight of the soul and adapts everything to its own purpose. . . . It allows only the universally binding, the average, the conventional. It not only puts up with socially useful falsity, but actually demands it and makes it a norm of communal existence, cutting man off from the first sources of life' (p. 212).

He then examines 'pure conscience,' fear, terror and anguish, love and compassion — another attempt, and a brilliant one, to define the respective qualities of Eros and Agapé:

> 'This is one of the most painful problems of Christian ethics. It shows that Christians have not been able to receive the fulness of the divinely human truth and that it is difficult for man to unite the love for God with the love for man, love for the Creator with love for the creature . . . In this respect a creative completion of Christian ethics is particularly necessary . . .' (pp. 239-240).

The problem will not be solved until the divine element in human love is generally recognized, accepted and revered, and Eros recognized as the messenger of God. Love has suffered an age-long period of desecration; one day it will be redeemed, and it is probably safe to affirm that in that redemption lies the salvation of man. But again, only a small proportion of beings born into the dark world are given an apprehension of this. In any case, a sanctification of love itself is needed, or rather, a dedication to its true source. In the section 'Sex, Marriage and Love' in this chapter, Berdyaev plunges boldly into definitions that will be unwelcome to many and hailed with relief by the few, for he leaves no vestige of room for hypocrisy, stressing the primary difficulty in sexual love: the fact that in essence this is necessarily the most personal and intimate of all human relationships, yet its social consequences necessitate legal regulation and a public aspect which must be, in the very nature of things, a violation. Hence the tragic clash between the individual and society. As for marriage:

> 'it constantly turns out to be a trap in which people are caught, either by being forced into it, or through mercenary motives, or through thoughtlessness and passing infatuation . . . Most marriages have no mystical meaning and have nothing to do with eternity. The Christian consciousness must recognize this' (p. 296).

In point of fact, if the Christian consciousness were to recognize this indisputable truth, sweeping away the false sentimentality and pernicious idealizing which implies that every marriage is inevitably founded on love, and instead affirm the sacramental value of love itself while passionately decrying the many marriages which are little less than sacrilege, there would be no further need for controversy on divorce: the problem would have solved itself.

> 'The doctrine of the indissolubility of marriage and the prohibition of divorce are social conventions which have no relation to the inner life of personality, have nothing mystical about them, and are thoroughly rationalistic' (p. 297).

'The inner life of personality.' This Berdyaev continually stresses as being the image of God in man. It is refreshing and encouraging to hear at last a profound thinker and Christian philosopher proclaiming certain truths about love and marriage which have too long needed an honest approach:

> 'Marriage is eternal and indissoluble only if its essence is eternal and not social, if it brings about the realization of the androgynous image of man and is a union of those who are truly "intended" for each other.'

How many marriages belong to this category?

Turning to more secular matters, the breadth and depth of his views on economics, politics, war, crime, psychology and all kinds of social problems are a salutary corrective to those who believe that a panacea is to be found

in any one of the contemporary attempts at a solution. The germ of the liberating truth is concealed in them all, but the whole truth in none. The only cure, as many besides M. Berdyaev ardently believe, lies in a deeper and richer understanding of Christianity. DALLAS KENMARE.

HIGHER CRITICISM OF THE QUR'AN*

Dr. Bell's translation marks a distinct forward step in the study of the Qur'an. Perhaps the simplest way to realize the difficulties of the task is to compare the methods used for the Old Testament. In the Old Testament itself there are certain parts which can be dated with certainty, *e.g.* the vision of Isaiah in the year that King Uzziah died. For the period of Kings any doubts or inaccuracies about the dates and lengths of reigns can be checked by contemporary Assyrian records. The provision of a sure standing ground in the history of the Kings, and some parts of the Prophets, enables us with a fair degree of certainty to find a place in time for the composition of parts of the Pentateuch.

In the case of the Qur'an there is no certain standing ground from which to begin, except the date of the migration to Medina in 622 A.D. The earliest Life of Muhammad is already affected by legend, and the 'Traditions' of his words and actions are to a far greater extent legendary, so that the task of anyone who would place the parts of the Qur'an in their historical setting, and explain their meaning in terms of this context, is exceedingly difficult. It is true that there are chapters in the Old Testament which defy attempts of scholars to date them; but they are comparatively few, and are most often such that their religious value is unaffected by their date. In the case of the Qur'an the uncertainty applies to almost the whole book, and there are few parts which can be dated with absolute certainty. Many passages are so obscure that apart from a historical context they are quite unintelligible.

Bodwell published a Qur'an with the *Suras* or chapters arranged in chronological order to the best of his ability. This attempt has been distinctly useful. But the *Suras* themselves are composite, and, unless they are split up, it is as impossible to get a chronological view of Muhammad's utterances as it would be to get a chronological view of the Old Testament by rearranging the order of the books while leaving each book intact.

Nöldeke, without producing a translation, worked out a scheme for the dates of the different parts of the Qur'an. This scheme forms the basis from which Dr. Bell started, but he has modified it throughout in view of new knowledge about the origins of Islam, and revaluation of extra-Qur'anic sources.

Up till now the tradition has been accepted by Western scholars that Muhammad did not compose a book, but that after his death the fragments of his uterances, either committed to writing or treasured in men's

* *The Qur'an.* Translated with a critical rearrangement of the Surahs, by Dr. Richard Bell. (T. & T. Clark. 1937-39. 2 vols. 12/6 each.)

memories, were collected and arranged in a more or less haphazard way to form the Qur'an. So long as this tradition was accepted, no useful purpose was to be served by attacking the literary problems of the Qur'an: one might as well discuss the problem why four particular hands should have been dealt in a game of bridge.

Dr. Bell then makes a bold step when he suggests that from about the second year after the migration to Medina Muhammad began to make his book. At once there are literary problems to be solved. Repetitions, contradictions, change of subject, and so on, can no longer be put down to the mere chance that the collectors of material found the scraps in that fortuitous order and had them copied as they stood.

Dr. Bell attempts to show how the inconsistencies have arisen, and he follows the orthodox methods of literary criticism. He looks, for instance, for doublets of which one is a revision of the other, both possibly made by Muhammad himself; for passages incorporated in the text from marginal notes; for passages written on the back of a sheet and incorrectly copied so as to follow what is on the front, and so on. Those who have tackled problems in other fields will know how hard it is to advance from the stage of a possible to a probable hypothesis. Dr. Bell has given the subject the deep study it requires, and one can feel sure that he will be satisfied if a substantial proportion of his reconstructions stand the test of future criticism.

It should be noted that up till now no scientific criticism of Islamic history and origins has been done by Muslims. It is the insistent demands for truth that have led Christians to perform this service first for Christianity and now for Islam. L. E. Browne.

THE CREDIBILITY OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH*

Tertullian, of all the Fathers of the Church the greatest master of epigram, wrote on one occasion, 'I believe because it is incredible.' When sceptics believe, it is for that reason. When rationalists believe, it is because what they believe seems to them to be credible.

Mr. Shelton, the author of *The Credibility of the Christian Faith,* comes in the second class and yet he wears his rue with a difference. He is not satisfied to believe because of the rationality of that which is proffered to him for belief. We use the word rational here as including not only our intellectual convictions but also the moral and spiritual convictions which do not conflict with the affirmations of reason, although they may and do transcend what reason can prove to demonstration.

Mr. Shelton desires, in addition, the living voice of the Church to support the rationality of that which is proffered to him for belief. In this case it is the authority of the Church of Rome which Mr. Shelton craves, provided that authority can be secured without Mr. Shelton being required

* *The Credibility of the Christian Faith.* By H. S. Shelton. (Simpkin Marshall. 8/6. 1937.)

to sacrifice the rights of his reason. To those who know the *credenda* to which the Church of Rome has tied herself, and how many of them are discredited at the bar of science, history and literary criticism, it will appear that Mr. Shelton is like a child crying for the moon. But human nature longs to have it both ways, and the practice of wishful thinking, if the wish be strong enough, invariably secures in the end the satisfaction which the wishful thinker is resolved to secure. The personal equation can resolve all antitheses and reconcile all contradictions either by the formulation of some higher synthesis or by lapsing into so profound a scepticism that truth and falsehood have no significance for it.

What is to be the future lot of Mr. Shelton his book does not indicate, but we suspect that in the end Rome and Home will be for him identical terms. Mr. Shelton was brought up in a Methodist family, but he had no liking for 'sensible conversion,' the testifying at class meetings, and the religious censorship which old-fashioned Methodism sought to establish over his religious development. We sympathise with him. Yet is not the religious censorship of totalitarian Rome even more exacting than that of old-fashioned Methodism? In this totalitarian age we still dare to maintain that the human soul is sacred and has rights of its own of which neither State nor Church may justly deprive it.

Mr. Shelton recognizes that the authority of the Church of Rome is based upon its belief in the infallibility of the Church; whereas the authority of the Reformed Churches is based upon their belief in the infallibility of the Bible. Of course modern criticism has played havoc with the old belief in the plenary verbal inspiration of Scripture, although not, we believe, with the supreme moral and spiritual affirmations contained in the Bible. However, in comparing these two authorities, the Roman appears to Mr. Shelton to be the more secure. He writes:

> 'We have already seen that it is easy to formulate in a coherent manner the scheme of Christianity taught by the Church of Rome. . . .'
> 'It is possible to reject the whole scheme, the natural outcome of which is agnosticism. Between these two extremes — Rome and Agnosticism—it is difficult to find a coherent, logical and stable position.'

Yet this is not really the dilemma for the modern educated man in Europe and America. That dilemma is more truly expressed by Renan: 'Between a materialism which is brutal and a religion which is unintelligent, O soul, poetic and pure, where should thy place be?'

Mr. Shelton desires, when controversies as to what is the Christian Faith arise, to have the 'living voice' of the Church to decide the issue. Doubtless many devout and earnest souls share Mr. Shelton's desire, but how is this 'living voice' to be heard? Is it in General Councils or Papal Bulls, or is it to be heard in the inspired utterances of Christian prophets and Christian saints which at a later period received the support of the *consensus fidelium*—the general consent of the Christian consciousness and

that consciousness the possession of the invisible Church, the Communion of Saints dispersed throughout the whole Christian world and doubtless existing in some measure in all Christian denominations? It is here, so it seems to me, that the living voice—the voice of the Spirit—can be heard speaking. But to hear that voice makes a very considerable demand on the spiritual perception and moral sensitiveness of the individual who would hear it—a demand which is much more exacting than the perusal of the Acts of councils or the pronouncements of Popes. When Jesus said to His disciples, 'I have many things to say unto you but ye cannot bear them now,' He indicated that the Christian Faith was not static but expanding and progressive, something to be learnt not simply by looking back, and that the learning of it would depend upon the guidance of the Spirit of Truth. If Church History has any lesson to teach us it is that the possession of the Spirit of Truth becomes the possession of the individual before it becomes the possession of the whole corporation. Therefore if Mr. Shelton would hear the 'living voice' of the Church, which may or may not at some later date be re-uttered in Church formularies, he must frequent the society of the prophets and the saints. We suggest to Mr. Shelton that he should take a less mechanical and a more poetic view of this 'living voice' of the Church.

Mr. Shelton does not seem to us to have grasped the full significance of his citation from Dr. Inge :

> 'It became clear to me, as soon as I began to think seriously about the foundations of belief, that the centre of gravity of religion had shifted in our day from authority to experience.'

Tertullian wrote a little treatise concerning the testimony of the soul naturally Christian. That would be Mr. Shelton's own soul, but enlarged, clarified, strengthened, by the testimony of many other Christian souls—the souls of the Christian prophets and Christian saints. Surely this should suffice rather than the hard, logical, ponderous utterances of the Church's Council Chambers.

We have read Mr. Shelton with close attention and find it difficult to decide where he stands. Sometimes he seems to argue like an open-minded seeker after spiritual truth. Sometimes he argues like a Romanist controversialist. In many cases he seems to begin in the one way and end in the other. The alternative he offers in religion to his reader between Rome and agnosticism is not a sound one. There is a *tertium quid*—the acceptance of the Christian Faith, not on the authority of Papal infallibility, nor on the authority of Biblical infallibility, but on the authority of something which is more secure—the authority of an enlightened and developing Christian experience. This authority appeals to the Christian rational, moral and spiritual consciousness for its justification—and finds it there.

Such an experience must be that of the individual himself, but in so far as he is wise, he will seek to verify and supplement his experience by refer-

ence to the experience of prophetic and saintly souls. This testimony does not assume that logical, dogmatic form which Mr. Shelton desires. Its appeal is poetic rather than logical. Its authority is prophetic rather than dogmatic. It is concerned with the centre rather than the circumference and finds it justification in life rather than in logic.

Napoleon the Great, for whom the dogmatic system of the Roman Catholic Church did not count, was won to sympathy and some measure of adhesion by the perusal of Chateaubriand's *Le génie du Christianisme.*

We venture one more suggestion, and that is that Mr. Shelton should exchange his view of the nature of the Incarnation, which seems to him to demand the Virgin Birth and the Immaculate Conception, for one which finds its classical expression in the prologue of the Fourth Gospel. Viewed in that way, the Incarnation is not merely a single historic event, restricted to Jesus Christ, but a Divine process uniquely consummated in Him and still proceeding through Him in Christian experience. This mode of incarnation is no more miraculous than the creation of the Universe, nor is it less Divine. H.D.A.M.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman*

THE BANKRUPTCY OF PACIFISM.

SIR,

For twenty years I have had two major interests in the realm of thought —Peace and Modernism. My reading, my thinking, my questioning have, in consequence, gathered round the subject of Peace and War. In further consequence, I had come to the deep conviction that war is futile, it encourages more evil than it cures, and that no one who had watched the history of the last twenty years could doubt this.

My experiences as a soldier in the Great War and my subsequent studies have made of me a pacifist and, if I may so put it with humility and reverence, an 'all for Christ' man. Thus I am in entire sympathy with the point of view put before us in the April *Modern Churchman* by the Rev. W. Mauleverer. With great regret, I find myself unable to follow you, whom, in other things, to follow has been a joy. Particularly do I join issue with you, Sir, in your contention that the Christian State ought not to be restricted, as is the Church, to the methods of teaching, persuasion, example and prayer. Why not? If it be a Christian State its methods ought surely, at least in declared principle, to be of a piece with those of the Church.

Had the State been Christian in this sense during the past twenty years we might never have been faced with this terrible dilemma. As it is, many of us are now determined not to forsake the way of the Church and what we conceive to be the way of Christ to play again with the way of the State. The way of the State may be, in your words, 'a last resort,' but it is a resort that is never forgotten and ever prepared for. It creates a psychological state of inhibition against a free experiment with the other ways. A. LYNCH.

Desford Rectory, Leicester.

[No very profound experience of human nature proves that the exercise of force is necessary to restrain evil-doing. If the State declared itself

unable to use force, the community would be at the mercy of criminals and anarchists. There is no doubt that the trend of our State policy for some years past has been to replace progressively the use of force by moral and rational influences propagated by popular education. By disarming to such a degree as to make Great Britain a second-rate Power, combined with a refusal to take up arms to enforce treaty obligations in connection with China, Abyssinia, etc., we encouraged the militant nationalities to proceed on their course of aggression in the belief that Great Britain would never engage in war again. It is not British militarism, but British pacifism, which may be charged as being a cause of the present war.—ED., *M.C.*]

THE PSYCHIC STREAM

SIR,

In your review of my book, *The Psychic Stream,* you term me an amateur, and, considering the revolutionary nature of the book, I feel that you have thus treated me in a very kindly and tolerant manner. Many theologians would have been less moderate in their words about me and used harder expressions.

In so far as I have never been trained in a theological college, your opinion about me that I am an amateur is correct. If I had been a professional theologian I would never have been able to put forward the opinions, or reach the conclusions, I have done. It would have been impossible for me to have overcome a theological training, especially when this takes place when the mind is young and plastic.

Because I am an amateur, in so far as I am not a professional theologian, I do not feel that I am less able, as the result of study and thought, to arrive at correct conclusions. When a desire to reach truth is strong enough all obstacles can be overcome, and anyone reading *The Psychic Stream* must realise, from the numerous standard books to which I refer, that only one determined to discover what is true would ever have troubled to cover such a vast field of thought as I have done.

You may think that I have missed what you term 'the real Christian thing,' but I have only drawn my own conclusions from the facts given, and, moreover, the book only attempts to discover the source and record the growth of the Christian Faith. It is not a treatise on Christian Mysticism.

Is modern enlightened Christian thought not largely indebted to amateurs? If professional theologians had had their way, I doubt if any progress would ever have been made. Thomas Paine, who wrote *The Age of Reason,* was an amateur. He was right and the professional theologians of his day were wrong, and treated him cruelly for writing what every intelligent person knows to-day to be true. It is, moreover, to amateurs that progress in religious thought is largely due, as they are not tied by vested interests and tradition. Paul was an amateur theologian, as were all the apostles and the early Christians. None ever passed through a theological college. Theology, in its correct meaning, is too vast a subject to be confined to a college course, a sect, or one form of religious belief. That is why I am glad I am amateur, and have in consequence been able to make a contribution to religious thought which I believe to be both new and true, and one which in time will revolutionize the outlook on religion in general and Christianity in particular.

ARTHUR FINDLAY.

Stansted Hall, Essex.
April 24th, 1940.

[Paul received a rigorous theological training in the school of Rabbi Gamaliel.—ED., *M.C.*]